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At the end of 2017 different groups of WTO members decided to launch talks on four subjects, setting 
aside the WTO consensus working practice. This paper argues that these ‘joint statement initiatives’ 
(JSIs) should seek to establish open plurilateral agreements (OPAs) even in instances where the outcome 
can be incorporated into existing schedules of commitments of participating WTO members. Designing 
agreements as OPAs provides an institutional framework for collaboration among the responsible 
national authorities, transparency, mutual review, and learning, as well as alternatives to default WTO 
dispute settlement procedures which may not be appropriate for supporting cooperation on the matters 
addressed by the JSIs. In parallel, WTO members should establish enforceable multilateral principles to 
ensure OPAs are compatible with an open global trade regime. 
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Since its establishment in 1995 the WTO has had little success in negotiating new disciplines on the use 
discriminatory trade policies. Instead, new rulemaking has been occurring in deep preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) (Dür, Baccini and Elsig, 2014). While beneficial to participating countries, deep 
PTAs are inherently constrained in addressing international policy spillovers given that major emerging 
economies have not been willing to participate in them. Such spillovers have been increasing, reflecting 
a steady rise in competition-distorting trade measures in the last decade (Evenett, 2019), many of which 
are only partially subject to WTO disciplines, if at all. The inability to (re-)negotiate multilateral rules 
has led to trade conflicts, notably between the US and China, and impeded cooperation to address global 
market failures and use trade policy for sustainable development.  
Consensus-based decision-making has been a factor inhibiting the ability of the WTO to engage in 
deliberations on new agreements. At the December 2017 Ministerial Conference, groups of WTO 
members abandoned the long-standing consensus working practice and launched four “joint statement 
initiatives” (JSIs) spanning e-commerce, domestic regulation of services, investment facilitation, and 
measures to enhance the ability of micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to utilize the trade 
opportunities.1 This shift to plurilateral engagement offers an alternative to the negotiation of (deep) 
PTAs to countries seeking to bolster trade governance by providing a mechanism for countries to 
cooperate on an issue-specific basis without having to liberalize substantially all trade. In doing so it 
creates opportunities for cooperation without requiring all 164 WTO members to agree.   
This paper reflects on the question whether and how plurilateral cooperation can revitalize the WTO, 
focusing on the JSIs. It builds on a previous article (Hoekman and Sabel, 2019) on open plurilateral 
agreements (OPAs) as a vehicle to support international regulatory cooperation in the WTO, arguing 
that JSIs should be conceptualized as OPAs, complementing the trade agreements that to date have been 
the staple of the WTO. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the ongoing JSI 
talks in the WTO and recent plurilateral trade initiatives outside the WTO. Section 2 presents a typology 
of trade-related cooperation to address different types of problems. Section 3 applies the typology to the 
JSIs and argues that OPAs provide a useful institutional framework to support the implementation of 
what is agreed in negotiations. Section 4 discusses governance principles that could be applied by WTO 
members to OPAs to ensure plurilateral initiatives are consistent with an open rules-based multilateral 
trading system. Section 5 concludes. 
1. The nascent shift to plurilateral initiatives 
Plurilateral cooperation is not new for the WTO. Many WTO agreements are the outcome of 
negotiations among the ‘principal suppliers’ of products and the principal ‘demandeurs’ for rules 
pertaining to a given area of trade policy. Although the practice has been to pursue cooperation through 
large ‘rounds’ that encompass many policy areas to permit cross-issue linkages and tradeoffs with a 
view to satisfying the Pareto criterion and increasing the potential gains from cooperation, in the GATT 
years there were several agreements that bound only signatories, ranging from anti-dumping to product 
                                                     
* Thanks to Dukgeun Ahn, Martina Ferracane, Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Petros Mavroidis, Michitaka Nakatomi, Robert 
Wolfe and participants in the 2020 Asia-EU Trade Roundtable (Waseda University), the Trade Multistakeholder 
Convention 2020 (World Economic Forum), the EUI-WTI World Trade Forum 2020 and a Columbia Law School seminar 
for helpful discussions and suggestions on previous drafts. Support from the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Sabel) and the European 
Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 770680 (RESPECT) (Hoekman) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/minis_13dec17_e.htm.  
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standards. Almost all came to be incorporated as multilateral agreements when the WTO was created in 
1995, but GATT practice illustrates that plurilateral agreements are nothing new for the trading system.2  
The JSIs span a cross-section of the WTO membership. The US participates in one (e-commerce). 
China and the EU participate in all four.3 Independent of whether a WTO member is a sponsor of a 
group, deliberations are open to all WTO members.  The E-commerce JSI talks involve 80+ WTO 
Members. Most are middle- and high-income nations.4 The focus of deliberation is on a mix of trade 
restrictive policies and digital trade facilitation.5 The former include regulation of cross-border data 
flows and data localization requirements, the latter include issues like electronic signatures, e-invoicing, 
facilitating electronic payment for cross-border transactions, and cooperation on consumer protection 
(e.g., combatting fraud). 
Services domestic regulation talks involve 60+ WTO Members and center on matters associated with 
authorization and certification of foreign services providers (licensing, qualification, and technical 
standards), not on substance of regulations. The aim is to reduce the trade-impeding effects of domestic 
regulation by enhancing transparency of policies through enquiry points; establishing good practice 
timeframes for processing of applications; acceptance of electronic applications by service providers, 
use of objective criteria, ensuring national authorizing bodies are independent and impartial, and 
mechanisms for foreign providers to request domestic review of decisions. 
Neither e-commerce or services regulation are new for the WTO. Both have been discussed since the 
late 1990s. A WTO work program on e-commerce was initiated in 1998, and a Working Party on 
Domestic Regulation was established in 1999. These work programs were anchored in existing WTO 
treaties. In the case of e-commerce this spans all three of the major WTO multilateral agreements – 
GATT, GATS, and TRIPS. The mandate of the working party on domestic regulation of services was to 
develop horizontal (cross-sectoral) disciplines called for in Art. VI GATS.  
The MSME and investment facilitation groups differ from the other two JSIs in not being tied to 
specific existing WTO agreements. The informal working group on MSMEs includes 90 WTO 
members.6 The aim is to identify measures governments can take to support internationalization of small 
firms. Recommendations to this effect will not be mandatory but are open to participating WTO 
members to adopt on a voluntary basis.7 Talks on investment facilitation were launched by some 70 
WTO Members in Buenos Aires in 2017 and grew to encompass more than 100 participants in late 
2020.8 The agenda excludes liberalization of inward FDI policies, measures related to protection of 
foreign investors and investor-State dispute settlement. The focus is solely on facilitation. All investment 
is covered, including services, i.e., facilitation of mode 3 is part of the discussion. Talks center on “good 
regulatory practices” such as transparency and predictability of investment-related polices; streamlining 
administrative procedures; soliciting feedback on proposed regulatory measures; information sharing on 
best practices and ex post monitoring and evaluation.  
Outside the WTO, groups of countries have also begun to negotiate plurilateral agreements that are 
distinct from PTAs to address trade-related matters and nontrade policies. Examples include the Digital 
                                                     
2 See, e.g., Hoekman and Kostecki (2009). 
3 China was a co-sponsor of three of the four groups in 2017. Initially China did not participate in the JSI on e-commerce, 
but it joined subsequently. 
4 As of end 2020, only five African countries participated: Benin, Cameroun, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria.  
5 For a summary of the issues that have been tabled by different participants, see https://etradeforall.org/wto-members-
submit-proposals-aimed-at-advancing-exploratory-e-commerce-work/ and Ismail (2020). 
6 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/msmes_05nov20_e.htm  
7 See Campos-Leal et al. (2020). 
8 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/infac_05nov19_e.htm. See Baliño et al. (2020). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796087
Plurilateral Cooperation as an Alternative to Trade Agreements 
European University Institute 3 
Economy Partnership Agreement between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore,9 the Digital Economy 
Agreement between Australia and Singapore,10 the Japan-US Agreement on Digital Trade,11 and 
negotiations between Singapore and South Korea on a digital partnership agreement.12 Observers have 
proposed extending such arrangements to create a ‘single data areas’ encompassing like-minded 
countries (Leblond and Aronson, 2019). Beyond the digital arena, there are ongoing negotiations 
between New Zealand and includes Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland on a plurilateral 
Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS).13 The Asia-Pacific digital 
agreements build on the e-commerce chapters of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and bilateral PTAs. The purported goal of the ACCTS is to negotiate 
an open plurilateral agreement, in the process demonstrating that countries can agree on how trade policy 
and trade rules can help drive the transformation of the economy to become more sustainable and 
inclusive.  
2. Horses for courses 
Plurilateral initiatives differ from traditional trade agreements in that (i) they are issue-specific or 
combine a small number of policy issues and (ii) do not center (solely) on liberalization of market access 
barriers. They raise important conceptual – and practical – questions regarding the incentive constraints 
facing participants that determine the feasibility of negotiating and implementing agreements.  
Trade agreements have four salient characteristics that are relevant from the perspective of 
considering when and how they may support – or impede – cooperation to reduce cross-border negative 
policy spillovers. First, they liberalize access to markets through a process of reciprocal exchange of 
trade policy concessions. Reciprocity permits internalization of the benefits of liberalization. Second, 
they rely on the national treatment principle to prevent ‘concession erosion’ – the use of domestic 
policies to substitute for trade policies, while leaving parties free to define their domestic regulations as 
they wish as long as regulation is applied equally to domestic and foreign agents. Third, there is a focus 
on trade facilitation as well as liberalization, i.e., efforts to reduce trade costs through transparency and 
identification of good policy practices. Fourth, they are self-enforcing: the threat of withdrawal of 
market access commitments (retaliation) is the mechanism used to sustain cooperation.  
An implication of these characteristics is that by design most PTAs are shallow integration 
instruments in the sense that signatories retain national regulatory sovereignty: they are free to regulate 
as they wish if measures conform to the national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) principles. 
‘Deeper’ PTAs go beyond the four basic characteristics by including provisions on the substance of 
domestic regulation, intellectual property rights, foreign investment, and product and factor markets 
more broadly. Deeper integration touches on matters that are of interest to a much broader constellation 
of domestic interest groups and is therefore – appropriately – more politically sensitive and complex 
                                                     
9 Chile, New Zealand and Singapore (2020); https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement/. 
10 Australia and Singsapore (2020); https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/services-and-digital-trade/Pages/australia-and-singapore-
digital-economy-agreement  
11 The agreement bans data localization, barriers to cross-border data flows and conditioning access to the market on 
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than shallow trade agreements. However, the core feature of all PTAs – shallow or deep – is preferential 
liberalization of market access barriers.  
In addition to PTAs, the WTO envisages two other forms of plurilateral cooperation among members 
on a sector- or issue-specific basis. In contrast to a PTA, neither requires liberalization of substantially 
all trade between signatories. The first alternative is to conclude a plurilateral agreement under Art. II.3 
WTO. The second is to negotiate a so-called critical mass agreement (CMA). In both cases negotiated 
disciplines apply only to signatories. They differ in that the benefits of CMAs apply on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all countries, including non-participating nations, whereas Art. II:3 
plurilateral agreements do not. An example of a CMA is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). 
The main example of an Art. II plurilateral is the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  
In considering different types of trade cooperation, countries must determine whether free-riding 
constraints apply and, if so, what constitutes a critical mass of participation that internalizes enough of 
the benefits within the participating group of countries. CMAs are only feasible if most of the benefits 
associated with trade liberalization are internalized by participants. If not, the WTO MFN requirement 
will preclude agreement. This constraint can be difficult to overcome, as shown by ITA negotiations 
and the talks on an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) to reduce tariffs on products salient for 
reducing carbon emissions, which have yet to be concluded.14 The ITA demonstrates that CMAs can be 
negotiated, but also that a necessary condition is that enough products are covered, and a large enough 
set of countries participate.15   
The top part of Table 1 characterizes these different types of trade agreements: multilateral package 
deals (trade rounds), PTAs, CMAs, and Art. II plurilateral agreements. All involve policy commitments 
and international cooperation among signatories. All address policies that by design discriminate and 
impede market access. The bottom part of Table 1 presents forms of cooperation that are domain-
specific, where the primary focus is not on liberalization (constraining the use of discriminatory 
policies). Such cooperation can take the form of harmonization (e.g., a commitment to develop and 
adopt common standards), implementing agreed good regulatory practices, and mutual recognition of 
equivalence of regulatory regimes. Cooperation will often have a market access dimension, but the focus 
is on domestic regulation. 
The benefits of cooperation may apply unconditionally to all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis 
or on a conditional basis. Examples of the former include collaborative efforts in fora such as the OECD 
and APEC to define good regulatory practices and agreement by countries to adopt these. They also 
include international collaboration to develop product and process standards in inter-governmental 
bodies such as the ISO. Cooperation involving identification and agreement on good regulatory practices 
can be applied on an unconditional MFN basis as it is insensitive to free riding considerations: the 
policies are in the self-interest of countries independent of whether other countries do so. 
                                                     
14 Mavroidis and Neven (2019) and De Melo and Solleder (2020) assess reasons for the difficulties in concluding the EGA 
negotiations successfully. 
15 Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn (2018) analyze the economic dimensions of the ITA. 
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Table 1 Alternative Instruments for Cooperation 
                                   Characteristics of cooperation outcome 
Type of cooperation Main issue Type of spillover Nondiscrimination (MFN) Benefits limited to participants 
 Type 1:  
Trade agreements 
Binding State-to-
State treaties with 















Multi-issue multilateral agreements 
(Uruguay and Doha rounds) 
Reciprocal preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
Issue-specific critical mass agreements  
(e.g. Information Technology Agreement; 
GATS Telecom Reference paper;   
Environmental Goods negotiations) 
Issue-specific, discriminatory plurilateral 
agreements under Art. II WTO 
(e.g. Government Procurement Agreement) 
























International standard setting (ISO, Codex 
Alimentarius, UNECE) 
 
Good regulatory practices (OECD; APEC)  
 
Open plurilateral agreements  
 Digital Economy Partnerships 
 COVID-19-related public health 
agreements 
 New WTO clubs 
 
Mutual recognition (conformity assessment 
agreements) 
Regulatory equivalence regimes 
(Unilateral: EU data adequacy findings  
Bilateral: air safety agreements;  EU Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade regime  
 
Clubs with trade penalty defaults 
(e.g., Agreement on Climate Change, Trade & 
Sustainability negotiations) 
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In many cases cooperation is likely to require joint action by the parties. Such conditionality can vary 
in depth and intensity, ranging from low to medium to high forms. A low form example is mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment mechanisms. A medium form is what Mattoo (2018) calls 
destination-specific exporter regulatory commitments, where a regulator (government) accepts to look 
after the interests of consumers in countries to which firms under its jurisdiction export (as defined by 
the regulatory authorities in the importing nations), without necessarily adopting an identical regulatory 
regime.16 A high form of conditionality is a regulatory equivalence regime, in which the regulators 
establish that regimes pursue similar objectives and are implemented so as to achieve the shared goal, 
permitting two-way flow of the goods or services concerned. Countries that do not have adequate 
regulatory capacity and enforcement institutions will not be able to benefit from mutual recognition, let 
alone equivalence arrangements.  
3. Fitting JSIs into the WTO  
An important question confronting JSI participants is the form of cooperation that is envisaged. The JSIs 
provide an opportunity to create OPAs, thereby demonstrating the capacity of the WTO to encompass 
variable geometry and cooperate on a nondiscriminatory basis. However, the JSI talks are not explicitly 
aimed at negotiating OPAs. As mentioned, the MSME initiative is not aimed to result in a binding 
agreement, but is limited to ‘soft law’, best endeavor-type commitments that will be embodied in a 
Ministerial declaration signed by participating countries. The JSIs on e-commerce and services domestic 
regulation are linked to existing WTO agreements and the outcome of negotiations may be embedded 
in participating WTO members’ schedule of commitments as opposed to a distinct agreement. 
Scheduling in the GATT and/or GATS is less of an option for the outcome of investment facilitation 
talks.  
Inscribing the results of negotiations into participants’ GATT and/or GATS schedules will insulate 
signatories from legal challenges by nonsignatories to whatever is agreed by participants, as scheduling 
ensures that implementation will occur on a nondiscriminatory basis (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2017). 
At the same time embedding JSI outcomes into national schedules makes the provisions enforceable 
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This may have implications for the 
feasibility of cooperation that goes beyond the need for attaining critical mass to address free riding 
concerns if this is a concern. As discussed below, the DSU may not be the most appropriate instrument 
to support implementation of agreements that go beyond disciplining the use of discriminatory policies. 
Explicitly conceiving and designing the substantive elements of what is agreed in the JSIs as an OPA 
could help to support successful cooperation by specifying enforcement mechanisms that are better 
designed to serve the purpose of signatories to an agreement.   
OPAs differ from ‘standard’ trade agreements – ‘Type 1 cooperation’ – in at least four ways 
(Hoekman and Sabel, 2019). First, OPAs are open to participation of any country able to satisfy the 
membership conditions, in contrast to PTAs that generally are closed to access by new countries. 
Second, insofar as OPAs address trade costs created by regulatory heterogeneity they do not lend 
themselves to quid pro quo exchange of concessions – what Bhagwati (1988) terms first difference 
reciprocity. Third, because they are domain specific, OPAs involve narrower and more limited 
commitments. A member must only undertake to meet the requirements that have been agreed for the 
issue or class of goods and services concerned. Insofar as an OPA requires only equivalent 
performance—not identical procedures or institutions—they permit members to produce the required 
outcome through their own regulatory regimes and institutions. Fourth, and related, implementation of 
                                                     
16 One can ask what the incentive is for the importing country to negotiate an agreement to this effect, insofar as it can – and 
presumably will – impose its domestic standards on imports. One possible reason is agreement permits cross-issue linkages 
to be made; another is that agreement may assist the exporting country to obtain assistance in strengthening institutional 
capacity needed for implementation. 
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OPAs calls for continuing reciprocal review of existing regulatory policies and their implementation, 
and joint evaluation of potential adaption to changes in circumstances. The potential for learning through 
regular interactions between regulators and/or a broader epistemic community involved in a policy area 
may also arise in the implementation of trade agreements but is less of a central feature given the narrow 
focus on disciplining discrimination.   
An implication of these different features is that OPAs may require less in the way of cross-issue 
linkage to permit cooperation. This is an explicit feature of the New Zealand, Chile and Singapore 
Digital Economy Partnership Agreement which is conceived to be open to any country interested in 
joining, and to facilitate participation through a modular design, allowing signatories to opt in or out of 
modules. This is very different from a standard trade agreement. A basic feature of all types of trade 
agreements is that they involve cross-issue linkages.17 If a proposed agreement reduces welfare for a 
country, linkage will be needed to satisfy the Pareto criterion, permitting cooperation if the benefits from 
including another subject exceed the losses associated with the initial proposal. Linkage may take many 
forms, including adding/subtracting issues, compensation mechanisms and side-payments.18 Maggi 
(2016) identifies three types of issue linkage in international agreements: negotiation linkage; 
enforcement linkage and participation linkage. All three are features of trade agreements. The first of 
these involves negotiating two or more issues in one agreement, with the possibility of trade-offs across 
issues, the goal being to conclude one agreement – a package deal that is Pareto sanctioned: all 
participants are better off. Given agreement, enforcement linkage involves action in one issue area to 
enforce compliance with commitments in another (cross-retaliation). An example is conditioning 
preferential access to the market on reform and enforcement of labor standards or protection of human 
rights.19  
Participation linkage comprises situations where the threat of sanctions in one area induces participation 
in an agreement addressing another policy area. All three types of linkage fall under the broader concept 
of conditionality – making cooperation in one area a condition for cooperation in another. Conconi and 
Perroni (2002) contrast this notion of conditionality with a separation rule, in which there are explicit 
prohibitions on using sanctions in one area to induce (enforce) cooperation in another. OPAs are a 
mechanism to assure separability. Cooperation is severable in the sense that if (part of) an OPA fails 
this need not affect cooperation in other areas. 
Issue linkage may increase overall potential gains, but as demonstrated by the failure of the Doha 
round, crafting a negotiating agenda that delivers large enough net gains to all parties is difficult. This 
is true especially if there are groups that lose from agreement to cooperate on a given policy area. While 
overall, in the aggregate, there may be welfare (real income) gains, in the absence of credible and 
effective compensation for specific losses, negatively affected groups have good reason to oppose a 
proposed deal. If policies are separable, cross-issue linkage is not needed – the payoffs of cooperation 
are independent of what governments may or may not do in other policy areas.  
Trade agreements are self-enforcing – the threat of withdrawing concessions sustains cooperation. 
There is no need for enforcement linkage. Binding dispute settlement enforced by the (threat of) 
withdrawal of market access is unlikely to be useful for encouraging cooperation on regulatory matters. 
It is more likely to have a chilling effect on the willingness to consider cooperation – due to fear of 
uncertain contingent liability or views by regulators that market access considerations will have adverse 
                                                     
17 See e.g., Conconi and Perroni (2002) and Limão (2005). 
18 On issue linkage and international cooperation see Haas (1980), Sebenius (1983), McGinnis (1986). 
19 A feature of nonreciprocal trade preference programs in which richer countries grant poorer countries better access to their 
markets without requiring the latter to offer reciprocity in terms of market opening is that conditionality may be imposed 
in other policy areas – i.e., there is cross-issue linkage. See e.g., Borchert et al. (2020). 
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effects on the realization of regulatory goals.20 Different systems are needed, based on transparency 
mechanisms (information collection, incident reporting, sharing of data, dialogue) and, as Hoekman and 
Sabel (2019) argue, severability. The latter is a feature of the CPTPP chapter on regulatory coherence 
which is not subject to binding dispute resolution. This was also taken off the table by the EU in the 
aborted TTIP talks.  
Enforcement linkages may be required in domain-specific cooperation where the aim is to internalize 
negative cross-border spillovers. These may be pecuniary or nonpecuniary. Examples include policy 
areas such as subsidies, activities of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), digital economy policies and 
cooperation in the use of trade policies to reduce national carbon footprints. In such cases retaliation 
within the domain of the policy area is not desirable. Enforcement linkage is needed instead.  
The domain-specific nature of OPAs and limited salience of enforcement mechanisms that rely on 
the threat of ceasing to apply what was agreed implies a need for variable geometry when it comes to 
enforcement. If cooperation involves implementation of good practices and a party to an OPA comes to 
believe that other approaches should be applied, this calls for discussion between parties to assess the 
reasons underlying a decision to pursue a different path. Matters are different for cooperation centering 
on polices that generate negative international spillovers, where the threat of retaliation may be effective. 
The upshot is that careful consideration is needed both when designing the substance of an agreement 
and the type of enforcement mechanism that is appropriate.  
The Working Party on Domestic Regulation that was the precursor to the JSI on services regulation 
proved unable to achieve consensus on criteria determining whether (when) restrictions on trade are 
needed to attain a regulatory objective and whether disciplines should encompass private standard-
setting bodies (Delimatsis, 2008; Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2016). Similarly, the e-commerce work 
program launched in 1999 did not lead to specific suggestions supported by the membership, aside from 
a time limited agreement not to levy taxes on data flows that has periodically been extended.  Lack of 
progress in coming to an agreement, notwithstanding extensive deliberation and effort, was in (large) 
part due to WTO members demanding (cross-issue) linkages with the Doha round,21 tactics that were in 
turn facilitated by the (perceived) need to anchor the outcome of discussions to existing WTO agreements.  
Shifting the focus to stand-alone agreements, even if implemented in part through incorporation of 
negotiated provisions into the existing schedules of participating WTO members, may facilitate getting to 
yes. In the case of services regulation such scheduling is straightforward, but in the case of e-commerce an 
OPA that addresses specific policies may be more efficient and effective than adding to extant GATT, 
GATS and/or TRIPS commitments. An OPA permits updating and improving salient existing WTO 
agreements in a more comprehensive and holistic manner, as the salient WTO agreements have become 
outdated – e.g., the sectoral classification and categorization of “modes of supply” in the GATS (Nakatomi, 
2019). An OPA can also make explicit whether and when the DSU applies and expand the scope for 
cooperation by defining alternative conflict resolution arrangements for specific matters where the DSU is 
not appropriate or effective.   
4. Preparing the ground for more variable geometry in the WTO 
What follows briefly discusses actions to support negotiation of OPAs, in the process highlighting areas 
where current JSIs could be strengthened and measures proponents of OPAs should consider in moving 
                                                     
20 Such concerns were an important factor in the demise of talks in the WTO on competition policy in the early 2000s. 
Competition authorities held the view that their mandate was to safeguard consumer interests, the contestability of markets 
and national welfare. In doing so, they do not distinguish between the behavior of domestic and foreign firms on the market, 
as opposed to the focus of trade negotiators on improving conditions of competition for national firms.  
21 A precursor Working Party on Professional Services agreed in 1998 on a set of principles for regulation of licensing of 
accountants and accountancy services. These were adopted by the Council on Trade in Services in 1998 but did not enter 
into force becasue of linkage to a successful conclusion of the Doha round negotiations. 
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forward.  The prospects for successful OPA negotiations will be enhanced if they are based on a solid 
evidence base, address a serious problem of concern to a clear constituency, are transparent as regards 
deliberations and eventual implementation, open to new members, and encompass appropriate conflict 
resolution systems. The latter can build on innovations that have been introduced in several extant WTO 
agreements, such as discussion of ‘specific trade concerns’ (STCs) in WTO committees (Karttunen, 
2020) and recourse to experts to assess reasons for non-implementation of an agreement, as is foreseen 
in the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (Hoekman and Sabel, 2019).  
4.1 Informing deliberations: epistemic communities and extant PTAs 
Successful international agreements addressing regulatory policies such as the WTO agreements on 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade and trade facilitation are all associated 
with a body of agreed technical knowledge and accumulated good will among the relevant national 
regulatory agencies. Haas (1992) refers to a group of stakeholders and experts linked in this way as an 
epistemic community.  Specifically, he defines an epistemic community as a group of professionals who 
share: 
 a set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social 
action of community members; 
 causal beliefs, derived from their analysis of practices to address problems in their domain, that 
serve as the basis for understanding how possible policy actions can support desired outcomes;  
 notions of validity—criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise; and  
 a set of common practices—associated with the problems to which their professional competence 
is directed with a view to enhance welfare. 
There are many policy domains in which such epistemic communities help support international 
cooperation, including trade facilitation (Hoekman, 2016), product safety (Yates and Murphy, 2019), 
competition policy (Kovacic and Hollman, 2011) and environmental policy (Sabel and Victor, 2017). A 
necessary condition for successful OPAs is a community that has an interest in international regulatory 
cooperation and a mechanism that supports informed deliberation in each policy area.22 Such fora can 
generate information on applied policies across countries, facilitate sharing experiences and help to 
identify good practices that reflect and respond to local capabilities and priorities.  APEC, the OECD, 
and the World Bank are examples of entities that provide institutional homes for this type of 
engagement. 
In the TFA context, such a community was organized around the WCO (which brings together all 
national customs administrations) and several international organizations), including UNCTAD, ITC, 
OECD, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Many of the regulatory standards 
referred to in the TFA were established in relevant international standards-setting bodies, notably the 
WCO. The WTO is not the appropriate institution for discussion on the substance of regulatory standards 
and makes no claim to that effect. It is a trade facilitating organization, not a standards setter. 
International regulatory cooperation and standardization efforts are important but are – and should be – 
pursued outside the WTO. This applies to areas addressed by WTO agreements such as the trade effects 
of product standards (the TBT and SPS agreements) and to areas that may become the subject of new 
WTO agreements or OPAs, e.g., the regulation of the digital economy. What matters for trade 
cooperation is that the trade community connects to the relevant epistemic communities and standards 
                                                     
22 See Hoekman and Sabel (2019); Hoekman and Nelson (2020). Sebenius (1992) discusses the importance of considering 
the interaction between the existence of epistemic communities and the form of bargaining that is pursued, including the 
scope/use of issue linkage.  
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setting organizations when considering efforts to reduce the trade-impeding effects of domestic 
regulatory regimes.  
The prevalence/role of epistemic communities varies across the JSIs. Two of the JSIs – e-commerce 
and domestic regulation of services – build on long-standing discussions in the WTO, and in both 
instances international business is an important demandeur for multilateral rules, reflected in active 
engagement by organizations such as the US Coalition of Service Industries and the European Services 
Forum. Digital trade has become a central focus of many APEC governments as well as the EU. The e-
commerce JSI builds on the experience obtained in negotiating provisions on digital trade and e-
commerce in recent PTAs,23 elements of which were included in the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership agreement that was concluded at the end of 2020. RCEP includes the 10 Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South 
Korea. Because China is a signatory, RCEP may provide a baseline for what is feasible to agree in the 
JSI talks, although many OECD member countries are seeking to go significantly beyond what is 
embodied in RCEP.24  
The recent experience of Asia-Pacific countries in negotiating digital partnerships mentioned 
previously reveals that there are differences in preferences and the feasibility of negotiating plurilateral 
digital trade agreements even among like-minded economies with very similar regulatory objectives. 
One reason for the multiplicity of digital trade agreements emerging in the Pacific is that countries are 
not all on the same page. This is not surprising and should not be an impediment to cooperation. It 
suggests the value of JSI participants seeking to create a digital trade OPA that establishes a common 
denominator set of provisions, and that is flexible in the sense of being able to incorporate modules that 
need not be adopted by all OPA members and that encourage regular interaction between authorities 
and stakeholders on the experience with implementing digital trade-related cooperation that spans only 
a few of its members. This is also an argument for seeking to pursue an OPA under the umbrella of the 
WTO as opposed to pursuing cooperation outside the WTO.25 
The JSIs on investment facilitation and MSMEs benefitted from joint engagement between G20 
members and international organizations working through the G20 Trade and Investment Working 
Group (TIWG). While this was a factor in moving the issues onto the WTO agenda, in comparison to 
the other two groups there are less clearly defined epistemic communities with a strong stake in 
international cooperation. This in turn is reflected in the discussions being centered on identifying good 
domestic practices – the focus (mandate) of most of the international organizations participating in the 
TIWG.  
In the case of MSMEs the informal working group is largely driven by governments and international 
organizations, notably the Geneva-based International Trade Centre. International industry associations 
                                                     
23 Burri (2021), Burri and Polanco (2020), Mitchell and Mishra (2020) and Wu (2017) discuss the coverage of digital trade 
and e-commerce in recent PTAs. 
24 The RCEP chapter on e-commerce includes provisions on consumer protection, protection of personal information, 
acceptance of e-signatures, measures requiring consent and removal of unsolicited spam at request of recipients that are 
similar to the CPTPP. Language on localization requirements and cross-border data flows is significantly weaker. In any 
event, provisions in the e-commerce chapter are excluded from dispute settlement. Instead, members are called on to consult 
bilaterally and raise a matter in RCEP Joint Committee. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam have 5 years longer 
to implement different e-commerce provisions. 
25 The various digital partnership agreements negotiated by Singapore are a case in point. Singapore has one with Chile and 
New Zealand, another with Australia, and is negotiating a third with South Korea. An OPA on digital trade in the WTO 
would provide a platform on which such agreements could be based, permitting deeper cooperation among a subset of 
countries. Such an OPA could also provide a forum for exchange of information on data adequacy equivalence decisions 
and deliberation on potential plurilaterization of bilateral initiatives. It is interesting to observe that the EU has recognized 
New Zealand as providing adequate data protection, but not Australia, whereas Australia has a digital economy agreement 
with Singapore that goes further than the digital economy partnership between Singapore, New Zealand and Chile.  
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are less of a factor reflecting the nature of MSMEs, although organizations such as the ICC have been 
supportive, as has been the WEF. Given that the focus of deliberation is on good practice measures to 
support internationalization of small firms that can (will) be implemented on a voluntary basis,26 there 
is no concern regarding free riding and neither scope nor need for cross-issue linkages or enforcement. 
The working group finalized a package of six recommendations and declarations to facilitate the 
participation of smaller businesses in international trade towards the end of 2020. Although voluntary, 
going beyond a Ministerial Declaration to create an OPA on MSMEs would have value by establishing 
a permanent focal point for deliberation and a platform for review of progress in adoption of the 
recommendations, sharing experiences by engaging with MSME representatives and orchestrating 
technical assistance programs. 
Several international organizations – UNCTAD, the World Bank – have actively supported the 
investment facilitation agenda, but there no analogue to the role played by WCO in the TFA talks, i.e., 
no international organization representing (bringing together) the national agencies responsible for the 
administration of investment-related policies. As argued by Berger et al. (2019), one reflection of this is 
that there has been limited empirical research on the impact of a potential agreement to help identify 
what an agreement could do to promote development or assist negotiators to focus on measures based 
on the size of likely benefits and the potential need for technical assistance for developing countries.  
4.2 A multilateral governance framework for OPAs 
Plurilateral initiatives offer a means to attenuate the need for consensus, but they raise potential concerns 
for nonmembers. Even if agreements do not discriminate – which is the presumption – countries that 
decide not to participate may have an interest in what is agreed to constitute good practice by a 
plurilateral group. In part this is because they may want to participate later, and in part because their 
firms may have to comply with regulatory policies adopted by a club of WTO members. In practice not 
all countries will be able to engage on an equal footing in the negotiation of an OPA. There are major 
differences in capacities to engage on regulatory matters and the ability to participate in a fully informed 
way. Some governments may find it difficult to determine the ‘return’ to applying a proposed rule. This 
suggests that any OPA should include an aid for trade component—mechanisms to assist countries 
improve their standards, regulation, etc. to the level that is required to benefit from the OPA. Including 
an operational aid for trade dimension in OPAs could enhance their relevance to low-income countries 
and enhance their inclusiveness. 
Ensuring that agreements are truly open to any country wishing to join, are fully transparent, and 
encourage participation by international and sectoral organizations with relevant expertise could help 
address potential concerns of nonmembers. Particularly important are to put in place mechanisms to 
assist countries not able to participate despite being interested in doing so because of weaknesses in 
institutional capacity and capabilities. While there is no basis for litigation on the substance of an OPA 
if it is scheduled and applied on a nondiscriminatory basis (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2017), an agreed 
set of principles that apply to new OPAs would provide assurance that incorporation of such clubs is 
consistent with the goals of the multilateral trade system. The absence of such a governance framework 
is a gap in ongoing JSI discussions in the WTO: it arguably reduces the incentive for nonparticipants to 
accept efforts by WTO members to form clubs and the credibility of claims by proponents that the aim 
is to promote multilateral cooperation.  
Addressing these types of concerns is important. One way to do so is through establishment of a code 
of conduct that signatories of plurilateral agreements commit to apply. Providing a governance 
framework for new plurilateral agreements that ensures they are consistent with multilateralism would 
help to recognize valid concerns of nonmembers.27 
                                                     
26 See Campos-Leal et al. (2020). 
27 This suggestion was first made by Lawrence (2006).  
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This can take the form of binding code of conduct that is incorporated in the schedules of 
commitments of WTO members that decide to apply them. There is a precedent for this in the GATS 
Reference Paper on basic telecommunications, which sets out specific obligations on the behavior of 
telecom operators that control access to the network. These disciplines become binding on signatories, 
and thus enforceable, through inclusion of the Reference Paper into their schedule of GATS 
commitments. Such inclusion cannot be blocked by any country as WTO members are free to make 
additional commitments if they wish to (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2017).  A Reference Paper on OPAs 
could be incorporated in the schedules of members who drafted it, with any WTO member interested in 
participating in an OPA negotiation or acceding to an OPA accepting to incorporate the paper into their 
schedules. As amendment of the WTO to include new provisions to govern the design elements of OPAs 
will be difficult if not impossible given the need for consensus, a pragmatic approach to incorporating a 
code of conduct is for a common Reference Paper to be incorporated into each new OPA that is 
negotiated. 
A Reference Paper on OPAs could include the following elements and provisions: 
1. Membership of an OPA is voluntary; WTO members that decide not to particpate will not be 
pressured to join at a later date;  
2. An OPA must be implemented on a nondiscriminatory basis, with benefits extending to 
nonsignatories. 
3. Openness to subsequent membership by WTO Members that did not join when an OPA was first 
agreed, and inclusion of a section laying out the requirements and procedures to be followed for 
accession by aspiring members;28 
4. Language stating that accession to an OPA cannot be on terms that are more stringent than those 
that applied to the incumbent parties, adjusted for any changes in substantive disciplines adopted 
by signatories over time;29 
5. An obligation to provide reasons to accession-seeking countries for decisions to reject 
membership applications; 
6. A provision committing signatories to provide assistance to WTO members that are not in a 
position to satisfy the preconditions for membership in terms of applying the substantive 
provisions of the agreement but desire to do so;30 
7. Where feasible and in instances where capacities must be built for a country to meet OPA 
requirements, consideration be given to establish a stepwise schedule of compliance; 
8. Provisions ensuring that nonparticipants have full information on the implementation and 
operation of the agreement. These should include: 
a) Compliance with WTO requirements pertaining to publication of information on measures 
covered by the OPA (along lines of Art. X GATT); 
b) Simple, robust notification requirements for OPA members regarding the implementation 
of the agreement, which could draw on recent proposals to develop augmented procedural 
guidelines for the operation of WTO bodies;31 
                                                     
28 Open access in the sense that once negotiated any OPA must permit accession by any WTO Member is not explicitly 
required in Art. X(9) WTO.  
29 This leaves open the possibility that parties to an OPA can offer accession on less demanding terms for developing countries 
if they agree to do so, but for reasons discussed below does not make this obligatory. 
30 Such provisions can draw on the approach embodied in the TFA – see e.g., Hoekman (2016). 
31 See Wolfe (2018) for an extended discussion on improving notification processes and performance.  
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c) Creation of a body to oversee implementation of the OPA that is open to observation by 
nonsignatories, including mechanisms to engage stakeholders in an ongoing conversation 
about how the agreement is working and future needs;32 
d) Annual reporting to the WTO General Council by the OPA on its activities; 
e) A mandate for the WTO Secretariat to assess the effects of implementing OPAs on the 
functioning of the trading system as part of the Director-General’s annual monitoring report 
of developments in the trading system. 
9. Inclusion of consultation and conflict resolution procedures for non-signatories of OPAs in cases 
where they perceive that incumbents do not live up to the foregoing principles;  
10. Provisions indicating whether the OPA envisages recourse to WTO dispute settlment 
mechanisms to enforce the agreement, and if so, specifying the standard of review as well as the 
criteria that will apply in the selection of arbitrators. 
These principles do not include a binding requirement to provide ‘special and differential treatment’ 
(SDT) of the type currently embodied in the WTO which permits developing countries to offer ‘less 
than full reciprocity’. This traditional notion of SDT would defeat a major rationale for pursuing many 
OPAs: to permit subset of countries to cooperate in areas not covered by WTO rules or to go beyond 
them by adopting what all agree are good policy practices. Insofar as OPAs deal with regulatory matters 
it makes no sense to consider that some countries should only partially implement whatever standards 
and processes are agreed, as this would undercut the achievement of common regulatory objectives of 
OPA members. The requirement that parties to OPAs must assist non-members desiring to participate 
but unable to do so because of capacity weaknesses addresses development differences more effectively 
than traditional SDT, and consideration of stepwise accession of new members addresses the problem 
of capacity constraints.  
Enforcement considerations 
The need for enforcement and recourse to DSU in an important design decision for potential OPAs. 
There are two dimensions to this question. The first concerns the type of cooperation that is envisaged 
– binding or best endeavors – and if binding, the substance of disciplines and the associated standard of 
review. The second concerns the ability of nonsignatories to invoke the DSU to challenge signatories of 
JSI agreements.  
Apart from the MSME case, if successful, the JSIs are likely to involve a mix of hard and soft law, 
akin to what is found in the TFA. The presumption of WTO members engaged in JSIs appears to be that 
if binding commitments are agreed, the DSU will apply. In the case of investment facilitation, for 
example, the EU has made this explicit (EU, 2020). If commitments pertain to discriminatory application 
of policies, recourse to dispute settlement is straightforward – the matter is no different from bringing 
cases under current WTO agreements. The ability to bring such cases would span both signatories and 
nonsignatories given the presumption that signatories apply agreements on a MFN basis. The delicate 
part will be to define what MFN means when it comes to provisions of an OPA pertaining to regulatory 
regimes – e.g., data adequacy, privacy, etc. Whether the DSU should – or even can – apply deserves 
careful consideration. In practice, it is very unlikely that regulators will accept to have a WTO panel 
second guess their decisions. This was demonstrated in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, which removed the possibility of disputes being brought 
based on the regulatory cooperation chapter (Hoekman and Sabel, 2018).  Analogously, the effort to 
establish ‘necessity test’ criteria in the WTO talks on services domestic regulation arguably was a major 
                                                     
32 Wolfe (2021) suggests options for WTO bodies to organize periodic sessions that focus on learning and engagement with 
stakeholders. 
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factor impeding success, given the associated prospect of litigation, even if the focus of an agreement 
were to be limited to procedural/process requirements.  
As noted previously, aside from commitments to refrain from explicit discrimination against foreign 
firms and service providers, recourse to the DSU may not serve signatories to an agreement. Alternative 
mechanisms are likely to be required. For example, insofar as enforceable provisions will be agreed in 
an investment facilitation agreement, alternatives to the DSU, including deliberations in the body 
charged with oversight of the agreement, consultations between parties informed by independent expert 
groups to understand and propose solutions to implementation problems, and regular independent 
monitoring of implementation progress may be more suitable. This in turn is a strong argument for 
crafting OPAs to provide the framework for cooperation. Each OPA can specify that measures involving 
disciplines on the use of discriminatory instruments will be subject to the DSU while providing for 
alternative conflict resolution procedures for regulatory matters. 
If parties to an OPA decide to rely on the DSU for dispute settlement for matters that do not pertain 
to discrimination, it is important to specify the standard of review that applies, e.g., limiting disputes on 
regulatory matters to procedural commitments that have been agreed, with no scope for striking down a 
jurisdiction’s substantive regulations. Disputes should be arbitrated by people with the salient 
professional background and expertise who understand the institutional context and the goals of a given 
agreement. This in turn requires revisiting the current process of selecting panelists which tends to draw 
from a pool of trade diplomats who are unlikely to have the requisite specialist knowledge of contested 
matters.   
The second dimension of enforcement concerns the ability and mechanism through which 
nonsignatories can challenge JSI members regarding the implementation of an agreement. Suppose a 
non-signatory WTO member C claims that its regulatory regime is equivalent to those of JSI agreement 
members A and B, whereas the latter decide to the contrary. If C has not expressed an interest in joining 
the negotiated agreement this should exclude it from bringing such litigation insofar as the application 
of provisions is conditional on joint action that permit cooperation between A and B. But what if C has 
sought to join an OPA and A and B reject it based, for example, on differences in regulatory regimes 
that are such to not permit C to be included?  Similar issues arise in cases where incumbent OPA 
members are alleged to impose more stringent requirements on countries wishing to accede to an OPA 
than apply to insiders. 
Assuming enforceable principles along the lines suggested above are agreed, such questions also 
arise for signatories of OPAs. Is the DSU the appropriate instrument? One reason it may not be is that 
the standard remedy – a call to bring measures into compliance – is unlikely to be very meaningful. 
Another is that a standard WTO panel and the Appellate Body may not be well placed to determine if 
authorities in a signatory are acting inconsistently with one of more principles. What is called for instead 
are approaches that put the emphasis on engagement between the relevant authorities that aim to 
establish the facts of a matter in an objective and independent manner, providing information that can 
serve as a basis to identify actions that can be taken to support the realization the principles that are 
agreed to apply to OPAs.  The type of expert advisory group process that was incorporated in the TFA 
is a good example, as it is premised on a presumption of good faith and focuses on identifying and 
resolving specific implementation problems. Putting in place such implementation supporting 
mechanisms is likely to be beneficial to the WTO more broadly, complementing innovations that have 
been put in place over time by WTO committees, such as the use of STCs (Karttunen, 2020; Wolfe, 
2020a). 
5. Concluding remarks 
Plurilateral agreements are nothing new for the trade regime. They were a core element of the GATT, 
permitting like-minded jurisdictions to agree on rules that applied only to signatories. In the transition 
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to the WTO, it was decided that most extant ‘Tokyo Round codes’ would be incorporated into the WTO 
as multilateral agreements and thus apply to all WTO members, including the many developing 
countries that had not signed them. This was possible because it was made part of a take or leave it 
package deal – it was made part and parcel of accession to the WTO. At the time this linkage strategy 
was pursued by code signatories to induce (force) all GATT contracting parties to implement what had 
been negotiated in the various plurilateral agreements during the 1970s and 1980s (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2009). In retrospect this stratagem looks much less strategic than many high-income country 
negotiators perceived it to be. Fear of potentially being confronted with a situation where countries 
would be forced to join agreements in the future became a reason why many developing countries used 
the consensus working practice to oppose efforts to engage in deliberations on ‘new’ issues, in turn 
incentivizing the turn to deep PTAs. Returning to the GATT model where plurilateral agreements were 
a feature, not a bug, could do much to support cooperation on a range of policy areas without entailing 
the need for complex and inflexible trade agreements.   
Success in converting the JSIs into agreements would help establish a foundation for WTO members 
interested in pursuing additional rulemaking. Plurilateral cooperation is not a panacea. It can however 
be part of the answer to the difficulties the WTO membership has experienced in addressing trade 
conflicts and negotiating new agreements. Much of what is on the table in the JSIs involves coordination 
failures or and efforts to identify good regulatory practices. This is valuable. The subjects of discussion 
are all areas where there are significant potential gains from cooperation and policy coordination. 
However, apart from the e-commerce talks, they do not address fundamental sources of recent trade 
tensions and conflicts. Preparing the ground for efforts to do so would ensure the WTO stays relevant 
in the 21st century. 
There are many policy issues that generate spillovers that could be addressed by OPAs. Incorporating 
the results of JSIs into formal OPAs will help establish a basis for large trading powers to consider using 
OPAs to agree on rules of the game in a range of contested policy areas. An example is the use of trade 
policy instruments in programs to combat climate change. The Paris Agreement authorizes countries to 
set national decarbonization targets and to form sector-specific ‘climate clubs’ for joint pursuit of 
national targets. An implication of the voluntary nature of national commitments under Paris is that any 
penalty defaults defined by climate clubs involving trade restrictions fall outside Paris. Although 
countries can invoke the general exceptions provision of the WTO to justify the use of trade measures 
as part of decarbonization initiatives, an OPA can make explicit how trade sanctions will be applied 
among members of the OPA to attain decarbonization targets they have agreed. The ongoing 
negotiations between Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand and Norway on an Agreement on Climate 
Change, Trade and Sustainability are seeking to do this. Preparing the ground for OPAs on these matters 
requires preparation, including data collection and analysis to assess the magnitude of spillovers and 
provide a basis for informed deliberation on the need for and potential form of international cooperation. 
This was a central necessary condition for the successful conclusion of the TFA. Launching such 
deliberations and developing a common understanding of what is at stake and what can be done is an 
important input into negotiating OPAs (Hoekman and Nelson, 2020). 
The scope for using OPAs as an instrument for cooperation would benefit from actions to facilitate 
deliberation in the WTO (Wolfe 2021) and from agreeing on a set of principles that participants in OPAs 
would sign on to. Much also depends on re-establishing an effective multilateral dispute settlement 
system. This is a key element of the ‘value proposition’ offered by the WTO: providing a de-politicized 
third-party system to enforce disciplines on the use of discriminatory policies. Action to ensure that the 
system can work effectively is therefore an important part of making the WTO fit for purpose to 
attenuate negative spillovers caused by domestic policies. As important is to develop and build on 
alternative conflict resolution mechanisms that have been used in WTO committees and that are needed 
to support regulatory cooperation. OPAs offer an opportunity to do so and in the process contribute to 
renovating this function of the WTO.  
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